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I. INTRODUCTION
Injury and proximate cause form two components of a plaintiff’s
prima facie negligence case.1 Although equals in this sense, they have
received starkly different treatment at the hands of judges and scholars.
Proximate cause has long attracted attention, yet has also managed to
defy repeated efforts at characterization and explanation.2 Injury, by
* Professor, Vanderbilt Law School. Thanks to my fellow conferees for a
stimulating set of conversations. Thanks also to Brooke Ackerly, James Booth, Mark
Brandon, Lisa Bressman, Jon Bruce, Paul Edelman, Michael Green, Steve Hetcher,
Nancy King, Richard Nagareda, Bob Rasmussen, Tony Sebok, Suzanna Sherry, Kent
Syverud, Robert Talisse, John Weymark, Christopher Yoo, and Ben Zipursky for helpful
comments on earlier drafts. The remaining errors are mine. This paper was supported in
part by a generous summer research grant from Vanderbilt Law School.
1. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965) (defining the elements of
negligence, albeit using the term “legal cause” in place of proximate cause).
2. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 45, at 311–12
(1941) (noting the degree of attention, and confusion, surrounding proximate cause
doctrine).
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contrast, seems to have been largely ignored.3
One of the many virtues of Professor Perry’s paper4 is that it prompts
reconsideration of this disparate treatment from both ends. By offering a
subtle and rich account of the related concept of “harm,” Perry permits
us to see that the concept of “injury” is normative, contestable, and
therefore laden with interesting questions. Likewise, his analysis
provides a springboard from which to launch an inquiry into proximate
cause. In this Commentary, I will undertake both of these projects, first,
by reviewing and elaborating Professor Perry’s thoughtful analysis of
harm, then by analyzing the distinction between the concepts of harm
and injury, and finally by sketching an account of proximate cause that
can help explain why it has a legitimate role to play in negligence law.
II. PERRY ON HARM
Professor Perry proceeds primarily by working against contrary
analyses offered by Joel Feinberg and Seana Shiffrin.5 My comments
will not attempt to retrace his critique of their work—it is clearly laid out
in his paper. Instead, I will try to reconstruct Perry’s positive claims
about harm.
His most basic claim is that a person can be said to suffer a harm only
if some relevant interest of hers has been adversely affected.6 Built into
this proposition are at least five discrete claims, each of which has
further implications. To summarize, and without introducing various
qualifications to be developed below, Perry maintains that:
(1) Harm is a normative concept rather than a purely descriptive
concept.
(2) Individual instances of harm are, as a normative matter,
treated as discrete effects, even when accompanied by
offsetting benefits.

3. Despite noting the existence of the injury element in torts such as negligence,
two of the leading torts treatises omit any separate treatment of the injury requirement.
See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS xv–xxxiii (2000) (demonstrating the absence of a
separate listing for the injury requirement); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS xxv–xxx (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (same). The
thinking seems to be that there is little to be gained from analyzing what renders a
broken leg or shattered psyche an injury.
4. Stephen Perry, Harm, Counterfactuals, and Compensation, 40 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1283 (2003).
5. See JOEL FEINBERG, Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming, in
FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 3 (1992); Seana Valentine Shiffrin,
Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm, 5 LEGAL
THEORY 117 (1999).
6. Perry, supra note 4, at 1303, 1309.
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(3) Harm generally can be described independently of how it
comes about.
(4) Whether one has suffered an adverse effect on one’s interests
is and ought to be assessed historically, rather than
counterfactually.
(5) Determinations of the appropriate measure of compensation
for harm may appropriately rely on a different criterion than
the historical criterion used to determine if harm has
occurred.
Let me briefly elaborate each of these claims.
It is tempting to think of ascriptions of harm as descriptions of facts.
Indeed, core instances of harm, such as broken limbs, seem to be
particularly brutish in their factualness. Yet the inference from
brutishness to factualness is misleading. Broken limbs are treated as
obvious harms not because harm is a matter of unadorned fact, but
because, on almost any plausible normative account of human wellbeing, dramatic loss of physical integrity will count as a significant
setback.7 The fact of the matter as to whether X’s limb is broken matters
to the assessment of whether harm has occurred. But the assessment is
not only factual.
So Perry’s first claim is that harm is a normative concept rather than
simply a factual one. More specifically, he cashes out the normativity
of harm in terms of a substantive distinction among human interests.8
It is only if a person suffers a setback to the right sort of interest that
she may claim to be harmed. It follows that an adverse effect on a
person’s interests is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the
existence of harm. This is because, if the interest affected is not the right
sort of interest, then the adverse effect on it does not count as harm.9
Although he is not concerned in this paper to provide a description of
what counts as the right sort of interest, Perry posits that there is a set of
7. One can imagine a conception of life in which instances of dramatic loss of
physical integrity do not count as harms but instead as benefits. For example, it is
sometimes said that there is an overall benefit in becoming partly disabled (e.g., by
losing one’s hearing) because it is only by doing so that one can gain access to
previously unavailable goods of community, spirituality, self-knowledge, etc. This just
highlights the fact that the question of what sort of effect should count as a harm will
depend on contestable judgments of political, moral, and legal theory.
8. Perry, supra note 4, at 1295.
9. Perry also points out that de minimis interferences to core interests might not
suffice to count as harms. Id. at 1303.
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“core” interests that, when adversely affected, generate harms. That
core, he supposes, includes an individual’s interests in bodily integrity,
pain avoidance, and emotional tranquility. By contrast, his prime
exemplar of a category of noncore (secondary) interests is the category
of “recursive” (or meta-) interests: interests in core interests. The
interest in avoiding a heightened probability of lost bodily integrity—as
opposed to lost bodily integrity itself—is an example of a recursive
interest. Perry believes that it is perfectly intelligible to describe
recursive interests as being adversely affected. Indeed, he posits that
individuals may sometimes have a right against others that they avoid
acting so as to interfere with these sorts of secondary interests.10 Still,
such interferences do not, in his analytic taxonomy, count as harms.11
Perry next maintains that, for purposes of determining whether a harm
has occurred, the law ordinarily conceptualizes harms discretely.12
Thus, if a person suffers a setback to a relevant interest, but also obtains
a comparable or greater gain to that interest, or some other interest, the
gain is not treated as annulling the harm. For example, suppose rescuer
D intentionally breaks unconscious P’s arm in order to pull her from the
wreckage of an accident and thereby save her life. By saving P, D has
conferred a benefit to P that can be supposed to outweigh the adverse
effect on P’s bodily integrity. Still, according to Perry, the law usually
does not, and conceptually we should not, treat the benefit of being
saved as somehow undoing the fact that P suffered the harm of a broken
arm. Of course, one might conclude that the benefit conferred on P
should affect our assessment of whether D was justified in harming P.
Alternatively, D might be entitled to an offset against any damages he
has to pay by virtue of having caused a harm to P. But none of this
denies that P experienced a harm.
Perry’s third claim is that the issue of whether a person has suffered
harm is, except in one special set of cases, analytically distinguishable
10. Id. at 1305–08. In an analysis somewhat similar to Perry’s, Professor Zipursky
and I have distinguished between “intermediate” and “ultimate” harms, as well as
“unripened” and “target” harms, and argue that only ultimate or target harms confer on
the victim the ability to satisfy the “injury” element of the negligence tort. John C.P.
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 1650 (2002).
I leave for another day whether clear analysis is best promoted by distinguishing (as we
do) among two types of “harm,” only one of which constitutes injury, as opposed to, or
in addition to, distinguishing between setbacks that amount to harms and setbacks that do
not (as Perry does).
11. In addition to recursive interests, Perry identifies other sorts of interests, such
as purely aesthetic interests, that might count as secondary. For example, the erection of
a hideous structure that blocks homeowner H’s previously unfettered view of a dazzling
landscape, but otherwise does not interfere with H’s property rights, is surely a setback
to H, but might not constitute a harm to H. Perry, supra note 4, at 1306–08.
12. Id. at 1304–05.
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from the issues of how that harm came about and who brought it about.13
To impose some ugly terminology on his position, we might say that he
regards harm as generally capable of being described monadically, as
opposed to dyadically or relationally. Perry takes the failure to perceive
the monadic nature of (most) instances of harm as one of the central
mistakes of Feinberg’s analysis. By focusing his efforts on parsing the
dyad of “A harms B,” Feinberg conflates the idea of causing harm with
the distinct idea of suffering harm.14 If hiker H trips on a tree root in a
virgin forest and breaks his leg, it is entirely appropriate, according to
Perry, to say that H suffered a harm, even if there is no one (else) who
can be said to have harmed H.
There is, however, an exceptional set of cases in which the setback
cannot be captured without reference to a person doing the harming.
Perry gives the example of an act of rape. Perhaps the central harm of
rape—the setback to the victim’s interest in autonomy—cannot, he says,
be captured simply by reference to the condition of the victim’s person
or state of mind. Such a characterization necessarily requires reference
to the fact that the victim was subjected to nonconsensual sex by
another.15
Perry’s fourth claim, and the central focus of this paper, is that there
are two different criteria or tests for assessing whether a person has
Both tests are
experienced a setback to a relevant interest.16
comparative—both seek to identify setbacks by evaluating the condition
of the relevant interests in two different states of affairs. They differ
because they draw comparisons between different states of affairs.
The first test, favored by Feinberg, is the counterfactual test. It considers
the condition of the relevant interest subsequent to an event and
compares that subsequent condition to a hypothetical condition, namely,
the condition that the interest would have been in had the event never
occurred. In algebraic form, the counterfactual test can be represented as
C(HY) – C(PE): the difference in the condition of the relevant interest(s) in the
hypothetical state and the post-event state. The second test, favored by
Perry, is the historical worsening test. It also examines the condition of
the relevant interest subsequent to an event. However, unlike the
13. Id. at 1294–95.
14. Id. Perry also rightly criticizes Feinberg for further conflating issues of
causation and issues of responsibility in his account of what it means to say “A harms B.”
15. Id. at 1295.
16. Id. at 1286.
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counterfactual test, the historical worsening test compares that subsequent
condition to an antecedent condition, namely, the condition that the
interest was in just prior to the occurrence of the event. Algebraically,
the historical worsening test can be represented as C(A) – C(PE): the
difference in the condition of the relevant interest(s) in the antecedent
state and the post-event state.
Although Perry does not stress this point, I think it is important for
purposes of analysis to emphasize that the two tests, though different in
substance, overlap considerably, especially in the tort context. Imagine
an instance in which P is sitting on a bench waiting for a bus. D drives his
car over the curb and into P, causing P to suffer a broken leg. Under
either test, P has suffered a harm. So far as we can know, B’s leg probably
would have been intact had A not acted as he did. Likewise, B’s leg was
in the condition of not being broken prior to A’s colliding with B.
Despite this overlap, Perry insists that the counterfactual test is not the
correct test for harm. In support of this claim, he relies primarily on a
famous tort problem in which two fires, one set by X, another set by Y,
merge to cause the destruction of Z’s property.17 It is assumed that each
fire was substantial enough that it would of itself have destroyed the
property. Given these facts and assumptions, Perry maintains that the
counterfactual test is committed to the counterintuitive proposition that Z
suffered no harm at the hands of X or Y. This is because it cannot be
said with respect to either X’s acts or Y’s acts that Z’s property would
have been in its prefire condition had not X or Y acted as he did. By
contrast, the historical worsening test reaches the intuitive result,
because before either X or Y acted, Z’s property was intact, whereas after
each acted, it was incinerated.
Perry’s fifth and—for purposes of my exposition—final claim
specifies that the adoption of the historical worsening test for harm does
not entail the propriety of using that test as the measure of compensation
owed by a wrongdoer who causes harm to the victim.18 Conversely, the
counterfactual test, which he deemed inappropriately employed as a
criterion for determining whether harm has occurred, might at least
sometimes be an appropriate benchmark for setting the value of
compensatory damages. Here, Perry proceeds cautiously, largely
content to make the negative (nonentailment) point. He does suggest,
however, that, as a matter of positive law, it is standard for courts in tort
cases to instruct juries to compensate tort victims in accordance with the
counterfactual test by awarding them the sum of money that will put
17. Id. at 1286–87; see Kingston v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913, 914–15
(Wis. 1927).
18. Perry, supra note 4, at 1309–10.
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them in the same position in which they would have been had they not
been wronged.19
III. HARM VERSUS INJURY
There is a great deal more in this rich paper than I have outlined here,
but I take the foregoing five claims to form the spine of Perry’s
argument. I now turn to evaluation. In this Part, I will attempt to clarify
and build on his analysis by revisiting the distinction between harm and
injury.
A. Injury, Harms, Rights Violations, and Lost Expectancies
I will begin my analysis by considering together the third and fourth
claims that I have attributed to Professor Perry, starting with the former.
It maintains that harm generally is capable of being described without
reference to how the harm was brought about, but that certain special
kinds of harm are not capable of being so described. An example of a
case that would seem to fall in the special category will help articulate
the exception and the rule.20
Suppose L owns a large parcel of land in a rural area whose surface is
covered with more than a foot of snow. One day, L is approached by D,
who wishes to drive his heavy construction equipment across L’s
property in order to reach a construction site. L refuses permission out
of plain orneriness: he stands on his property rights. Now suppose two
alternative scenarios. In the first, L wakes up the next morning, goes for
19. Id. Perry quotes Lord Blackburn’s opinion in Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal
Co. for the proposition that courts typically instruct juries in tort cases to employ the
counterfactual test to measure damages. Id. at 1310. According to Blackburn, the jury is
to award “that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured . . . in the
same position as he would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong.” Livingstone v.
Rawyards Coal Co., 5 App. Cas. 25, 39 (P.C. 1880) (appeal taken from Scot.).
Although “would have been” is the signature language of the counterfactual test, a
certain amount of care is needed here because there is a sense in which the historical
worsening test also employs counterfactual analysis. For example, one could state it as
follows: Victims have suffered harm only if, but for the harm, they would still be in the
condition that they were in had the tort not occurred. Indeed, courts often use
counterfactual language to convey the idea of historical worsening in the context of
instructing jurors on what it is that their damage award is meant to compensate. See
Heidi Li Feldman, Harm and Money: Against the Insurance Theory of Tort Compensation,
75 TEX. L. REV. 1567, 1578–79 (1997) (discussing typical judicial formulations).
20. The following example is drawn from Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563
N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
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a walk with snowshoes, and discovers tracks in the snow on a remote
corner of his property indicating that D went ahead and crossed it with
the heavy equipment. In scenario two, L goes for a walk and finds that a
large herd of wild animals has crossed his property. Assume in both
scenarios that there is no effect on the land except that the snow on the
surface of this remote corner of the property has been tamped down.
Thus, we can assume that L has suffered no setback in terms of his use
and enjoyment of his property or the economic value of the property.
For either scenario, has L suffered a harm, in Perry’s view?
I take it that his position would be that, if L has suffered any harm, it
is only in the first scenario, in which D brought his equipment across the
property. This is because the invasion of L’s right to exclude others
from his land will only qualify as harm if it is one of those special cases
in which the adverse effect must be specified in conjunction with a
description of how it came about. L suffered an invasion of his rights
only because another person purposely intruded. By contrast, in the
case in which the wild beasts caused the same consequence, L cannot
claim to have suffered a rights violation. At best, he has a claim to an
adverse effect on something that would seem to qualify as one of Perry’s
secondary interests: interference with L’s aesthetic sensibilities.
Perry could invoke his category of special cases to describe the first
scenario as one in which L was harmed. In doing so, his categories
would track at least some judicial usage.21 However, I think the contrast
between the two scenarios helps to show that L’s misfortune in the first
scenario is somewhat awkwardly captured by the idea of L’s having
suffered a harm, especially given Perry’s “historical worsening”
conception of harm (discussed in more detail below). This is not to deny
that there is a temporal aspect to L’s treatment at the hands of D. Prior
to the time of D’s acts, L’s right to exclude had not been interfered with,
whereas after that time it had been. But the purely intangible nature of
the interference—the fact that L suffered a setback only in the form of
D’s refusal to recognize L’s intangible right to exclude other persons
from his property—suggests not so much that L suffered a special kind
of harm, but that L’s experience is better captured without reference to
harm. The negative effect on L, one might say, did not consist of a
change in L’s actual condition, nor the condition of L’s land, and absent
such a change in condition, we are dealing with a different category of
negative effect.22
21. This is one way in which the Jacque court expressed its holding. Id. at 160
(describing this sort of trespass as generating a harm).
22. This point can perhaps be made clearer by considering a hoary example from
tort law. Suppose that B, neighbor of A, throws a rock that travels across A’s yard and
lands on a public street on the far side of the yard, never having made contact with
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It is crucial to emphasize that a decision to follow the conceptual path
just charted by concluding that L was not harmed at the hands of D by
no means entails that L lacks a tort cause of action against D. Indeed,
this is precisely the significance of the distinction between the concept
of harm and the broader concept of injury. Tort causes of action such as
negligence typically require the plaintiff to prove the occurrence of an
injury as part of her prima facie case.23 But injury is a relatively
capacious normative concept that includes not only harms, but also other
adverse effects, such as rights violations. For example, courts have long
permitted actions for harmless trespasses to property, which are signified
by the award of nominal damages.24
Thus, a court entertaining a trespass action by L against D might
readily conclude that D’s conduct was tortious notwithstanding the
absence of harm. Employing legalese, it might alternatively conclude
that the violation of L’s rights creates, as a matter of law, an inference of
harm.25 With these options available, it may be that Perry would do
better, in terms of the consistency of his analysis of the concept of harm,
were he to eschew the idea that there is a special class of harms that
require a different sort of description than the general run of harms, and
instead treat these cases as instances of wrongs that cause a class of
injury distinct from any harms that they might also cause.
The suggestion that rights violations can and perhaps should be
described independently of harms also ties in with Perry’s fourth and
main claim, to which I now turn. This claim asserts that, for purposes of
defining harm, the idea of “adverse effect” to relevant interests is and
anything (other than the air) in A’s yard. Suppose also that neither A nor anyone else
other than B was present at the time: B informs A about what happened after the fact. B
has committed a trespass on A’s land notwithstanding the absence of any disturbance in
the condition of the land. See DOBBS, supra note 3, § 54, at 108 (“It is trespass to . . . fire
a bullet across [another’s land] . . . or even to extend an arm into the airspace.”).
23. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
24. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 50, at 95, § 56, at 113. The award of nominal damages
might suggest that tort law treats misconduct causing harmless rights violations as less
grave than misconduct causing harm. This is not so. The Jacque court, for example,
determined that purposeful harmless trespasses at least sometimes warrant the imposition
of substantial punitive damages. 563 N.W.2d at 159–62. In distinguishing harms from
rights violations, I do not claim (nor does Perry) that harmful misconduct is categorically
more culpable or serious than harmless rights violations. Nor do I mean to deny that the
foregoing hypothetical is unusual in that rights violations typically are accompanied by
harms.
25. This usage is also employed by the court in Jacque. 563 N.W.2d at 160 (“The
law infers some damage from every direct entry upon the land of another.”).
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ought to be cashed out in terms of the historical worsening test, rather
than the counterfactual test.
As indicated above, Perry’s central argument for the impropriety of
the counterfactual test as the criterion for determining whether harm has
occurred rests on the example of the joining fires case. His claim is that
application of the counterfactual test to that case results in the
counterintuitive finding of no harm.26 I suspect, however, that a defender of
the counterfactual test for harm could avoid this problem by asserting
that the plaintiff who loses his house because of the two independently
sufficient fires has suffered harm by virtue of the two fires, treated as a
unit or single event. After all, if both of them had not occurred, the
plaintiff’s house would have been intact. Therefore, under the counterfactual
test, the plaintiff suffered a harm.27
I will not dwell on whether this move will suffice to rebut Perry’s
criticism. Instead, I want to further explore the implications of adopting
the historical worsening test. In particular, I want to suggest that, just as
its application to rights violations might suggest that rights violations are
best conceptualized as nonharmful injuries, its application to another
class of cases may suggest the existence of another category of adverse
effects that generate injury and liability yet fall outside the category of
harms. The easiest way to identify this category is to turn our attention,
momentarily, from tort to contract.
Contract law poses an apparent challenge for Perry’s endorsement of
the historical worsening test as the exclusive test for determining whether
harm has occurred. Indeed, this challenge seems to explain in part why
Feinberg rejected the historical worsening test.28 Here we encounter what
Fuller and Perdue famously termed the “expectation interest.”29
Some breaches of contract generate consequences that quite readily fit
the historical worsening test’s criterion for adverse effect. These are
breaches that affect what Fuller and Perdue called the “reliance
26. Perry, supra note 4, at 1286–87.
27. Perry’s critique of the counterfactual test may suffer from the same conflation
that tripped up Feinberg in that it seems to fuse the question of whether, on a
counterfactual analysis, either or both of the two fire-igniters can be deemed to have
caused the plaintiff’s harm (under the but-for test, they cannot, since neither’s conduct
was a necessary condition for the harm to occur) with the question of whether, on a
counterfactual analysis, the plaintiff can be deemed to have suffered a harm (seemingly,
he can).
28. See Perry, supra note 4, at 1287 (describing Feinberg’s argument that the
historical worsening test must be rejected because it cannot account for the intuition that
someone who is prevented from entering and winning a beauty contest suffers a harm).
29. L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936) [hereinafter Fuller & Purdue I]; L.L. Fuller & William
R. Purdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2, 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1937)
[hereinafter Fuller & Purdue II].
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interest.”30 They leave the nonbreaching party with fewer assets than
before the time the contract was entered into, perhaps because that party
incurred expenses to prepare for and undertake performance prior to the
breach.31
But what of breaches that prevent the nonbreaching party from
attaining a condition of being better off without leaving her materially
worse off—cases in which the only harm to the nonbreaching party is to
her expectation interest? Can these be accommodated within the
historical worsening conception? Suppose, for example, A enters into a
valid contract with B to sell widgets to B for a set payment. A, however,
breaches and does not deliver the widgets, for which B never pays. Has
B suffered a historical worsening by virtue of the breach? Perry’s
comments about Feinberg’s beauty pageant example—which suggest
that a detained contestant who misses the pageant because of the
detention could claim to have suffered harm in the form of interference
with her opportunity to win the pageant—indicate that he may be
inclined to conclude that B has suffered a harm under the historical
worsening test.32 A’s breach made B worse off than he had been because
it denied him an opportunity that he once had, namely, the opportunity to
have and use the widgets, presumably to increase his welfare.
As with defining rights violations as a “special kind” of harm, there is
nothing necessarily incoherent about treating lost expectancies as
historical worsenings.33 Still, the description seems awkward for two
reasons. First, there is at least a superficial tension between treating loss
of opportunity as harm and yet maintaining, as Perry does, a distinction
between core and noncore interests. Indeed, it seems that something like
this tension is what drove Fuller and Perdue to conclude that
expectancies were ‘second class’ interests, interferences that generated
no claims to having been treated unjustly. In their view, the interest in
30. See generally Fuller & Purdue I, supra note 29; Fuller & Purdue II, supra note 29.
31. Again, Perry wants to distinguish sharply between harm and compensation for
harm. As explained below, so long as the plaintiff experiences a historical worsening of
a relevant interest, he is perfectly entitled to claim that certain heads of damages (e.g.,
future income) are appropriately set by reference to the counterfactual test.
32. Perry, supra note 4, at 1292–93.
33. Of course, this analysis presumes that the relevant antecedent condition is the
condition the nonbreaching party was in just after contract formation, but prior to breach.
An argument will be needed as to why that is the right baseline, as opposed to the
condition of the nonbreaching party just prior to contract formation, at which point in
time the nonbreaching party did not have the option that he “loses” by virtue of the
breach.

1325

GOLDBERG.DOC

9/24/2019 1:12 PM

having one’s contractual expectations satisfied is not a core interest.
They therefore saw no reason grounded in justice for contract law to
protect the expectation interest: absent a harm, there is nothing to
correct.34 Instead, interferences with expectancies should be remedied
only to serve pragmatic or utilitarian ends.35
While Perry need not be committed to these conclusions,36 Fuller and
Perdue’s perception that expectancies do not seem to be interests on the
same order of, say, the interest in bodily integrity, does suggest the need
for an explanation as to why he is willing to treat these disparate
interests as members of the same category. By necessary implication
from his definition of harm, if Perry is going to treat lost opportunities as
harms, then he is treating them as core, rather than secondary, interests.
It is incumbent on him, therefore, to say more about why they deserve
“first class” status.
Even if Perry can provide this explanation, and can appropriately treat
interferences with expectancies as historical worsenings—namely the
destruction of previously enjoyed opportunities—one can imagine special
instances of contract breaches that cause the nonbreaching party a loss,
yet do not seem to involve historical losses of opportunities. Thus, if
Perry remains committed to historical worsening as the exclusive
criterion for harm, he is probably obligated to treat at least these cases as
involving nonharmful breaches. For example, assume that C is a lonely
and out-of-work actor who was planning to spend Saturday at home
watching golf on television, not because he particularly wants to, but
because there is nothing better for him to do. Fortunately, however, A
calls C on Friday night and offers to pay C if he will serve as a clown at
a children’s birthday party. C readily agrees because he would rather be
clowning than watching TV anyway. In fact, although he did not say as
much to A, he was prepared to clown for free; getting paid was a bonus
for him. C, incurring no preparation expenses, performs appropriately.
A refuses to pay. Has A’s breach caused C to suffer a harm under the
historical worsening test? If so, how is that harm defined? Of what
opportunities has C been deprived?37 Here, Perry seems committed to
34. Fuller & Perdue I, supra note 29, at 56–57.
35. Id. at 60.
36. Indeed, as discussed briefly below, Fuller and Perdue’s argument seems to rest
on a basic confusion over the difference between harms and injuries. They reasoned
that, because breaches interfering only with expectancies do not generate harms (i.e.,
Perry’s historical worsenings), the nonbreaching party has no claim in “corrective
justice” to a remedy. But it does not follow that, just because the nonbreaching party
suffered no harm, he suffered no injury: Loss of expectancy, in other words, might be an
injury without being a harm. As such, a person who suffers such a loss can claim that, as a
matter of justice, he ought to be compensated for that loss by the person responsible for it.
37. One answer might be that C has been deprived of the option of performing and
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describing this breach of contract as being actionable without proof of
harm (or to asserting that the law should employ the fiction that C was
deprived of an opportunity, even though he was not). That is, he seems
obliged to say that this breach caused C no historical worsening, but was
actionable nonetheless, which in turn would indicate that contract law
does not always require a harm as a predicate to an action for breach.
So far, my argument has pointed toward the conclusion that, given
Perry’s historical conception of harm, at least some actions for breach of
contract seem to not be grounded in harm to the nonbreaching party.
Rather, the loss to these plaintiffs appears capable of identification only
through the counterfactual test. It might seem, then, that it is open to
him to draw a distinction on this basis between contract, on the one
hand, and tort, on the other. Contract, in this view, is distinct from tort
in part because it treats pure loss of expectancy as actionable interference.
Perry does not draw this set of inferences and, in my judgment, he is
wise not to do so. For there are tort actions based on disappointed
expectancies that are not attended by lost opportunities. Consider, first,
the misrepresentation torts, such as fraud and negligent misrepresentation.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts gives the following illustration,
which I will embellish, to clarify the scope of liability for fraud. A, a
seller of land, falsely represents to B that a certain parcel of land
contains valuable timber. A tells B that the land is available for $5000.
He also falsely asserts that the land is worth a good deal more than that
because of the timber and that the reason he is willing to take only $5000
is because he is desperate for cash and cannot wait to sell the land on the
open market. B actually and justifiably relies on A’s misrepresentations
and purchases the land. It turns out that there is no usable timber. It also
turns out that, even without the timber, the land has a market value of
$5000. B still has an action for fraud—in the eyes of the law he has
suffered an injury, notwithstanding that he is no worse off than prior to
having been defrauded. For this injury, B is entitled to compensation
equal to the difference between the actual value of the land ($5000) and
getting paid. I wonder, however, if this is just a way of applying the counterfactual test
using the language of the historical worsening test. C is restored to the position he “was”
in, but the position he was in is defined as the position of being able to attain the
condition in which he would have been had the contract been performed. As suggested
above, one can express the historical worsening in the language of the counterfactual test
without mangling English syntax. See supra note 19. This is not to say that they are the
same test, only that verbal formulations can easily disguise one in the appearance of the
other.
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the value of the land had there been usable timber on it.38
Another tort that seems to render conduct actionable even in the
absence of historical worsenings is the tort of interference with contract,
or, more to the point, interference with noncontractual expectancy.
Suppose X learns that Y is about to invest in Company 1. In justified
reliance on X’s intentional and material misrepresentation that Company
2 is a better investment because it has recently been awarded an
important patent, Y foregoes investing in Company 1. However, just
before Y invests in Company 2, she learns of the misrepresentation. In
the meantime, the stock of Company 1, in which Y would have invested
but for X’s fraud, has taken off. Even if Y suffered no out-of-pocket
losses, Y may be able to recover from X for tortious interference with a
noncontractual expectancy: X’s conduct would amount to actionable
interference by “wrongful means.”39
The examples of tortious interference and fraud suggest that historical
worsenings are not required to generate tort liability, at least with respect
to torts generating losses of economic prospects. Here again, it may be
to Perry’s advantage to continue to insist on historical worsening as the
test for harm, yet also acknowledge that, in these sorts of cases, tort
compensates a non-harm injury, namely the injury of lost expectancies.
Were he to do so, he would be left with a relatively neat tripartite
division of injuries that, depending on the satisfaction of other elements,
may generate tort liability: harms, rights violations, and lost expectancies.
To sum up Perry’s position and my response, I take him to offer, if
only tentatively, the following line of reasoning:
(1) Person P suffers a harm if a core interest of hers undergoes an
historical worsening (subject, perhaps, to a de minimis exception).
(2) Rights violations (understood as special harms) and lost
expectancies (understood as lost opportunities) are appropriately
described as historical worsenings of core interests.
(3) Therefore, rights violations and lost expectancies constitute
instances of harm.
Although nothing in the foregoing discussion suggests that these claims
are logically inconsistent or incoherent, it does, I think, offer reasons to
reconsider step (2) above—the decision to classify rights violations and
lost expectancies as harms. It bears repeating that, even if Perry were to
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 cmt. i, illus. 4 (1977). I realize that
this last point involves the use of the counterfactual test to measure damages, rather than
determine harm. Its use, however, helps bring into focus the difficulty of identifying
what adverse effect B suffered other than lost expectancy.
39. DOBBS, supra note 3, § 446, at 1258–59, 1262 (discussing the contours of
tortious interference with economic opportunities and the idea of “wrongful means”).
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rethink this step and to conclude that neither rights violations nor lost
expectancies constitute harms, he can still readily account for the fact
that such setbacks sometimes support causes of action in tort and
contract. Essentially, he would be saying that harms constitute only one
of three types of setbacks that can ground such actions. To use
vocabulary introduced earlier, he might say that injury to the plaintiff is
a necessary condition for the establishment of liability in contract and
tort, but that the category of injury contains at least three distinct forms
of interference with a person’s interests: (1) harms (historical worsenings of
core interests), (2) rights violations, and (3) lost expectancies (losses
measured counterfactually).
Still, there will be cases that elude this typology and, I believe,
confound Perry’s desire to define harms exclusively by reference to
historical worsenings. Suppose A and B, husband and wife, are
contemplating having a child. Their doctor informs them that, because
of their blood types, they run a significant risk that their child will be
born deformed. He also gives them a bottle of pills and informs them
that, if either of them takes one of the pills within a few hours before
sexual intercourse, the risk of birth defect will be virtually eliminated.
For no good reason, A and B forego the medication and conceive a child,
C, who is later born with only one arm.
It strikes me as quite intuitive to say that C has suffered a harm as a
result of A’s and B’s negligent misconduct.40 Yet the adverse effect on
C’s interest in bodily integrity is not readily captured by the historical

40. Even if these facts would not generate a negligence claim, that claim would
not, I think, fail because C lacks a valid claim of injury. Rather, depending on the
jurisdiction, he may face obstacles because of restrictive duty rules or intra-family
immunities.
One might argue that the A-B-C example presents an instance of nonfeasance, which
might alter the characterization of C’s fate, because, at least on certain views of
causation, nonfeasance by definition cannot “cause” any consequence, whether harmful
or otherwise. In this view, A and B could not have caused harm to C, but instead, at most
failed to confer a benefit on him.
If necessary, the hypothetical can readily be changed to avoid any implication of
nonfeasance. For example, suppose that the doctor informs A and B that if both of them
were to drink alcoholic beverages in the twenty-four hour period prior to conception, they
would run a very high risk of having a child with a serious physical deformity. Suppose
that A and B nonetheless, and for no good reason, drink considerable amounts of alcohol
just prior to conceiving C and that their drinking can be shown to have been a cause of C’s
birth defect. Here, I think, we would have an instance of misfeasance causing harm to C,
notwithstanding the absence of any historical worsening experienced by C.
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worsening test.41 C was never in a condition of having two arms and
hence is no worse off now, at birth, than he was at any time from just
after conception forward. Perhaps one can say that C lost an opportunity
to be born with two arms, but it seems forced to attribute that opportunity to
someone that does not yet exist. Here, then, we seem to have an
instance in which we are dealing with a harm, yet the counterfactual test
more readily captures the nature of the worsening. C is worse off
because he is not fully intact, as he would have been had A and B acted
with due regard for his physical well-being.42
My point in raising this example is not to suggest that Perry is wrong
to link harm to historical worsening as a generalization, nor to undermine
the tripartite typology of adverse effects on interests that I have
developed herein. Rather, it is to note that analytic typologies have their
limits. Experience, in all its variety, confounds the aspiration to
complete coherence in this area of the law as much as any other.
B. Harm and Damages
On my reconstruction, Perry’s fifth claim is that, notwithstanding the
inappropriateness of using the counterfactual test as a criterion for
determining whether someone has suffered a harm, it might still be an
appropriate measure of the damages a wrongdoer ought to pay to
compensate for that harm.43 Damage payments, he notes, cannot
literally annul the harm—they do not erase the experience of historical
worsenings. Instead, they constitute a payment in light of those
worsenings. And because payment cannot be a literal restoration of the
status quo ante, there is no particular reason to latch onto historical
worsening as the appropriate measure of damages. Conversely, the
counterfactual test may at least sometimes be deemed the appropriate
measure for damages.
I think Perry is right that the use of the historical worsening test to
determine whether harm has occurred does not entail in any strong sense
the adoption of a particular measure of damages. However, I also note
that the impossibility of turning back the clock does not provide an
41. To avoid misunderstanding, I am not positing that C is bringing a “wrongful
life” claim. The harm asserted here is not that C would have been better off had he never
been born. Rather, it is that he would have been better off born with two arms.
42. Perry perhaps could argue that, notwithstanding the apparent adverse effect on
C’s bodily integrity, this is another instance of a rights violation unaccompanied by
harm. A and B, on this view, committed the equivalent of a “harmless” trespass to land
by negligently causing C to be born with one arm. Again, however, this seems an
unnecessarily odd locution, as contrasted to saying, simply, that C suffered a harm
because he would have been intact had A and B been more careful.
43. Perry, supra note 4, at 1309–10.
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affirmative reason to prefer one measure over another. Regardless of
whether the judge instructs the jury to set damages at an amount equal to
the difference between plaintiff’s pre-tort and post-tort condition, or
between a hypothetical condition and his post-tort condition, the jury is
usually being asked to assign a value to something that cannot be valued
with anything approaching precision. Impossibility gives us no reason
to prefer one or the other.
Interestingly, the converse may not hold true. For cases in which it is
nearly possible to restore the status quo ante, historical worsening might
set the appropriate measure of damages. For example, suppose surgeon
S’s carelessness causes patient P to develop a symptomless postoperative
infection that is nonetheless detected and must be treated to avoid harm
to P in the future. Otherwise the surgery is successful. S prescribes a
very expensive antibiotic for P that P takes with no side effects. Assume
that there is no additional pain, psychic harm, or inconvenience to P, and
hence that the only setback P experiences is the cost of the medicine. In
these circumstances, a payment from S to P equal to the value of the
money P spent on the medication would, for all intents and purposes,
restore the status quo ante. P would be made whole. Moreover, makewhole would seem an appropriate measure of compensation. P’s out-ofpocket loss is a plausible measure of what we would want S to pay to P.44
As we shift from a scenario of out-of-pocket losses to losses that do
not admit of being annulled, or nearly annulled—for example, physical
harm, pain and suffering, and emotional distress—the intuitive appeal of
historical worsening as a measure of damages wanes. For these sorts of
losses, the law can no longer meaningfully engage in the project of
making good the plaintiff’s losses, or returning the plaintiff to her pretort position. Rather, as Perry suggests, it can only offer compensation
that is appropriate in light of the plaintiff’s losses, where propriety may
be determined by a host of factors, including historical, counterfactual,
and equitable considerations.
Black-letter law on damages appears to track the distinction I have
drawn between cases involving out-of-pocket losses and those involving
other forms of loss. Generally, tort damage rules attempt to put an
injured person “in a position substantially equivalent in a pecuniary way
44. It is a plausible measure, but not the only one. For example, one might argue
that make-whole compensation should be supplemented by an additional sum in
recognition of the wrong done to P, a sum that is owed independently of any harm
suffered.
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to that which he would have occupied had no tort been committed.”45
But this is just to say that tort damages aim to compensate the plaintiff
for what has happened to him. The abstract concept of compensation, in
turn, gives rise to different measures depending on the nature of the
harm to the plaintiff. A person complaining of economic and property
losses can often be placed in a position “substantially equivalent” to the
one he formerly occupied.46 It makes sense to speak of this sort of
plaintiff as being made whole by a damage award. For one complaining
of injuries to body and mind, money damages are “not the equivalent.”47
Here the law cannot coherently aspire to the idea of making whole. In
these instances, fair compensation, not full compensation, is what tort law
aims to deliver.48
IV. HARMS, WRONGINGS, AND A RATIONALE FOR
PROXIMATE CAUSE
In this Part, I will use Professor Perry’s second claim—that, in
identifying instances of harm, neither law nor morality tends to treat
benefits as annulling harms—as a launching pad for an examination of
the concept of proximate cause. Just to be clear, I do not mean to saddle
Perry with a set of claims about proximate cause. He has not chosen on
this occasion to discuss that concept. Still, his analysis permits exploration
of it. Moreover, concern over proximate cause’s intelligibility was one
of the central impeti for this conference. Thus, it seems appropriate to
open a brief inquiry into the animating principles of proximate cause.
We can begin the inquiry, as I have just suggested, with Perry’s
observation about the tendency to treat benefits as offsetting rather than
annulling harms.49 Certainly he seems correct that ordinary discourse
observes the anti-annulment idea. Imagine a doctor who appropriately
administers a medicine to her patient that cures a life-threatening
infection, yet also produces severe and recurring headaches. It is common
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1979).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 912 cmt. b. It would be an interesting exercise to identify the type of
cases in which judges first employed the language of “making whole.” One might
expect to find them first using it in cases of property damage, where the metaphor has
some purchase, then only later invoking it as a generic description of the measure of
damages for all tort cases. The latter would be a regrettable development, in that the
metaphor of making whole has come to dominate and distort our conceptions of tort law.
See John C.P. Goldberg, Rights and Wrongs, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1828, 1851–53 (1999)
(reviewing ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW (1999), and
noting the undesirable tendency of corrective justice theorists to use the make-whole
measure as the centerpiece of their analyses of tort).
49. Perry, supra note 4, at 1304–05, 1311–13.
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to refer to the latter as “harmful side effects”: harms notwithstanding the
overall benefits conferred.
The principle that benefits do not annul harms seems also to hold in
reverse. Suppose, for example, Y has a rare food allergy and X
innocently causes Y unknowingly to ingest food containing the relevant
allergen. As a result, Y experiences euphoria for a day, but then suffers a
miserable illness requiring a month’s stay in a hospital and resulting
permanent injuries. Here it seems appropriate to say that Y enjoyed a
benefit by virtue of the food poisoning, even though Y is worse off
overall because of the severity of the ensuing harm.50
To note that benefits and harms do not annul one another is, again, not
to claim that they ought not, in some circumstances, offset one another.
Indeed, as this conference attests, there are many complexities facing
any account as to when offsets are, or ought to be, permitted and when
they will affect judgments as to wrongdoing and justification, as well as
judgments as to the appropriate level of compensatory damages. The
issue of offset is posed, for example, by the familiar hypothetical of the
careless cab driver who crashes and causes his passenger a broken leg, in
turn causing the passenger to miss a doomed airplane flight. For most,
the strong intuition here is that the driver should not be granted an offset
against the broken leg equal to the value of the substantial benefit he
conferred by causing the passenger to avoid death in the plane crash.
What can explain this intuition?
One way to sharpen our understanding of the taxi case, at least in the
context of assessing legal responsibility, is to think in terms of the
intersection of two bodies of law: tort and restitution. Indeed, such an
approach is invited by Perry’s anti-annulment argument. In the taxi
example, this would first entail seeking to isolate the harm suffered by
the passenger and asking whether it provides the basis for an action in
negligence, which presumably it does. Having carved out the passenger’s
claim for the harm, we next ask whether a cab driver who does not injure
his passenger but simply fails to deliver him to the airport on time,
thereby preventing him from boarding a doomed plane, can bring an
action for restitution—unjust enrichment—against the passenger. Surely
50. If the poisoning were to result from X’s intentional or negligent act, then we
might be more inclined to resist the idea that Y received any benefit from the poisoning.
However, that intuition is likely to rest on a judgment that X, as a wrongdoer, should not
be credited for bringing about a benefit to Y, rather than a judgment that Y received no
benefit.
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not. Under these circumstances, at least, the fortuitous conferral of an
unrequested benefit will not support a claim in restitution.51 To put it
another way, to the extent the passenger was “enriched,” it seems not at
all unjust that he, rather than the taxi driver, retains the benefit.
Perry also alludes to another way of capturing the intuition behind the
taxi example, which some conferees dubbed the “symmetry” principle.
Here, the notion is that, just as a wrongdoer should not be held
responsible for fortuitously caused harms, so too, he should not be able
to claim credit for fortuitously caused benefits.52 Consider another
familiar example: the driver who first speeds without incident, then
resumes careful driving at a normal speed, after which he collides with
another car at an intersection, injuring the other car’s driver. Even if the
victim of the crash could prove that the driver had been speeding at some
time prior to the accident, his negligence claim will founder because the
careless conduct—the speeding—does not stand in the right relation to the
collision; its only significance was to bring the driver to the intersection at
a different time than he would have otherwise been there.53 The symmetry
principle would suggest that, just as the victim who fortuitously suffers
harm at the hands of the careless driver cannot recover, so too, the taxi
driver cannot claim credit for the benefit gratuitously conferred.
Of course the symmetry principle will only support the common
intuition about the right result in the taxi example if fortuitousness does
affect, or ought to affect, our attributions of responsibility for harms.
And here, finally, we arrive at the issue of proximate cause: whether and
why tort law would limit responsibility to exclude certain instances of
fortuitously-caused harms. If this conference is any indication, Perry’s
invocation of the symmetry principle faces an uphill battle, given that its
organizers profess great puzzlement over the idea that fortuity ought to
limit responsibility in tort law as well as morality generally.
With respect to tort law, the puzzle, I gather, arises out of the
51. The case for denying the driver’s restitution claim strikes me as overdetermined.
First, it is not clear that there is a meaningful sense in which the driver voluntarily
conferred a benefit on the victim, seeing as he was unaware, and had no reason to
believe, that his actions would in any way benefit the victim. Second, even if his
conduct were to constitute the voluntary conferral of a benefit, it was gratuitous, and
gratuitous conferrals do not generate a claim for restitution absent mistake, coercion,
emergency, or some other basis for a reasonable expectation of compensation on the part
of the driver. Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Significance of Restitution, 67 TEX. L.
REV. 1277, 1284 (1989) (describing the “negative rule” to the general principle of
disgorging unjust enrichment). Third, even if there were some basis for thinking the
driver was entitled to expect compensation, such compensation surely is not required as a
matter of justice or equity, given the facts of the case.
52. Perry, supra note 4, at 1312–13.
53. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC
PRINCIPLES) § 29 cmt. h, illlus. 8 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002).
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following chain of reasoning. In a tort suit brought against an intentional or
careless wrongdoer, we, by definition, confront an actor deserving of
some form of sanction.54 The actor, after all, is a wrongdoer. Moreover,
although we generally adhere in criminal law to some notion of the
punishment fitting the crime, in tort law we permit disproportionate
sanctions. So, for example, the careless driver, whose carelessness consists
merely of taking his eyes off the road for an instant, may be required to
pay hundreds of thousands of dollars in compensatory damages.55 It
cannot be the case, then, that tort law’s refusal to hold wrongdoers
responsible for fortuitously-caused harms is driven by a principle of
proportionality in sanctions.56 And, because there is no other obvious
candidate for a principle within the family of principles having to do
with attributions of responsibility that can explain the salience of
fortuitousness, it follows that limits based on that quality are unmotivated:
they pose a puzzle, at least for justice-driven accounts of tort law.
The puzzle dissipates, however, if one takes a certain view of what tort
law aims to do. In this view, tort law, like criminal law, is concerned to
offer a legal response to wrongdoing. It is not understood, for example,
as a scheme designed efficiently to deter socially undesirable risk-taking.
However, it differs fundamentally from criminal law because it is not
concerned to sanction and deter wrongs per se or on behalf of the public.
Rather, it is designed to empower victims of wrongs to seek redress from
their wrongdoers. As such, tort actions require plaintiffs to show more
than that somebody committed a wrong so as to cause them harm. In
54. In this discussion, I will leave aside claims grounded in strict liability. I should
note, however, that the following explanation of proximate cause as instantiating a
requirement of “wronging” does not thereby render it incapable of explaining why
proximate cause limitations apply to instances of strict liability. This is because the
concept of “wronging” or “mistreatment,” as I employ it, is not limited to morally
blameworthy conduct, but instead may include objective (nonblameworthy) fault, as well
as conduct that, though lawful, generates unfair or disparate risks of injuries to others.
55. See Jeremy Waldron, Moments of Carelessness and Massive Loss, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 387, 387 (David G. Owen ed., 1995)
(offering this example).
56. But see Michael L. Wells, Proximate Cause and the American Law Institute:
The False Choice Between the “Direct-Consequences” Test and the “Risk Standard,” 37
U. RICH. L. REV. 389, 391 (2003) (asserting that proximate cause doctrine exists “to save
the defendant from the unfairness of paying huge damages for a small departure from
due care”). However desirable such a limit might be as a matter of moral or political
theory, it is clear that proximate cause doctrine as it currently exists fails to deliver such
a limit, given that, so long as a harm is foreseeable or within the scope of the risk, the
defendant sued by the innocent plaintiff is left on the hook for its entire amount.
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addition, they must show that they suffered harm or other injury by
virtue of having been wronged. In tort, unlike in crime, a wrong is
not enough. There must also be a wronging.57 In Cardozo’s words,
“Affront . . . is . . . the keynote of the wrong.”58
Doctrinally, the requirement of wronging is captured within several
tort concepts. For example, it is sometimes instantiated in the requirement
that the plaintiff establish an appropriate nexus between the duty and
breach elements of the negligence tort.59 As Cardozo famously explained in
Palsgraf, even a plaintiff to whom a defendant owes a duty of care has
no cause of action if she establishes only that some other duty—owed to
others or to society generally—was breached.60 Thus, Mrs. Palsgraf was
owed a duty of care by the railroad and was harmed by the careless
actions of two railroad conductors who jostled another passenger. Yet
she herself was not wronged. Because the jostling occurred well away
from where she was standing, it was not reasonably foreseeable to
persons in the position of the conductors that their wrongful conduct
would have any effect on a person in the position of Mrs. Palsgraf.
Therefore, the conduct in question—although perhaps antisocial, as well
as wrongful to persons standing near the conductors—could not have
amounted to a wronging of her; it did not constitute a harm flowing from
a breach of any of the duties that were owed to her.
Cardozo himself appears to have believed that Palsgraf’s duty-breach
nexus analysis provides an adequate instantiation—or at least the only
doctrinally supported instantiation—of the principle that a tort plaintiff
cannot prevail without establishing that she has been wronged. That is
why he was content to conclude that, had Mrs. Palsgraf been able to
establish a breach of duty to her, her claim would not have foundered on
the issue of proximate cause.61 Subsequent courts, however, have

Id.

57. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
The argument for the plaintiff is built upon the shifting meanings of such words
as “wrong” and “wrongful,” and shares their instability. What the plaintiff must
show is “a wrong” to herself; i.e., a violation of her own right, and not merely a
wrong to some one else, nor conduct “wrongful” because unsocial, but not “a
wrong” to any one.

58. Id. at 101. It bears repeating that I am employing “mistreatment” and “wronging”
in a sense capacious enough to capture unintentional misconduct. See supra note 54.
59. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third)
and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 709–12 (2001)
(discussing the nexus requirement).
60. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101.
61. Id. In a recent article, Dean Hurd and Professor Moore mistakenly interpret
Cardozo’s refusal to treat proximate cause as a doctrine instantiating the requirement of
wronging as manifesting his acceptance of a purely risk-based conception of negligence,
under which causation of harm is rendered irrelevant to the definition of the wrong of
negligence. Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the Air, THEORETICAL
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rejected this aspect of his reasoning by altering the meaning of the
proximate cause element of the negligence tort. Indeed, this is perhaps
the central upshot of the switch from tests that focused on the directness
of the causal sequence between carelessness and harm to modern
formulations, which require the plaintiff to prove either that she suffered
a harm of a type that was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant at the
time of acting, or that the harm consists of the realization of at least one
of the risks that rendered the defendant’s conduct careless.62
To help see how, pace Cardozo, proximate cause can also instantiate
the requirement of wronging, consider two variations on yet another
careless driving example. First, imagine a person who, while driving his
car on a street in a moderately busy part of town, carelessly throws a
half-filled paper coffee cup out of the driver’s side front window. The
coffee proceeds to splatter on the windshield of a car coming in the
opposite direction, temporarily blocking the vision of the driver of that
car, who swerves, strikes, and seriously injures a pedestrian standing on
the far sidewalk.
Now imagine the same careless act—the throwing of the half-filled
coffee cup by the driver—except that, instead of hitting another car’s
windshield, the cup lands harmlessly in the road. However, a pedestrian
walking along the far curb sees the tossing of the coffee, stops in his
tracks, and raises his arms in indignation over the driver’s act of
littering. Only because the pedestrian happens to stop at that precise
point and gesticulate, he makes contact with a tree limb, which in turn
disturbs a hidden nest of bees, many of which sting him, causing him to
suffer disfiguring welts and considerable pain.63
INQUIRIES L. 333, 348–54 (2002). Here they conflate “small ‘n’ negligence” (the fault
element of the tort of negligence) with “big ‘N’ negligence” (the four-element tort).
While Cardozo did sometimes cast the notion of fault in terms of a notion of undue risk,
he was quite adamant in Palsgraf and elsewhere that fault be distinguished from
negligence in its entirety. Thus, for Cardozo, a complete claim of negligence would
require a showing not only that the defendant acted unreasonably by unduly risking the
well-being of another, but that this unreasonable conduct amounted to a breach of a duty
owed to a person such as the plaintiff to take care not to cause a certain kind of injury to
the plaintiff. To borrow Ripstein and Zipursky’s helpful terminology, Cardozo
understood the negligence tort as instantiating duties of noninjury, rather than duties of
noninjuriousness. See Arthur Ripstein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective Justice in an
Age of Mass Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 214, 218–21 (Gerald J.
Postema ed., 2001) (distinguishing between these types of duties).
62. DOBBS, supra note 3, §§ 183–85, at 451–60 (describing different tests for proximate
cause).
63. I assume that the pedestrian was not physically endangered by the airborne
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A court, I think, ought to permit a jury verdict for the plaintiff in the
first case, yet rule for the driver as a matter of law in the second case.
Moreover, I think that the difference between the two cases turns in this
instance on proximate cause, not duty or the duty-breach nexus.
Physical injury to nearby pedestrians was a foreseeable consequence of
tossing a half-filled coffee cup out of a moving car on moderately busy
street, hence the driver in both instances owed pedestrians a duty to take
reasonable care not to cause physical injury to them. Moreover, in both
cases, the driver breached that duty by tossing the cup out of the car for
no good reason. And, in each case, the careless conduct functioned as a
but-for cause of injury to the plaintiff. Thus, if the first plaintiff is
entitled to prevail, while the bee-sting plaintiff should lose, it is not
because the latter is unable to prove that the driver carelessly caused her
an injury that he was duty-bound to guard against, but rather because the
injury came about too fortuitously.64 The littering driver committed a
wrong, and that wrong harmed the bee-sting victim. But the driver still
did not wrong the victim because he could not reasonably foresee that his
act of littering would produce bee stings, and with it injuries. To make the
same point in the language of “scope of the risk,” the risk of a pedestrian’s
being injured by a bee sting was not one of the risks that inclines us to
label throwing litter out of a moving car to be a careless activity.
Regardless of whether the test for proximate cause is cashed out in
terms of foreseeability or the risk rule,65 when applied in cases like the
bee-sting hypothetical, what the doctrine achieves is very similar to
what Cardozo achieved by invoking duty-breach analysis in Palsgraf.
The bee-sting plaintiff loses, just as Mrs. Palsgraf lost, because he
coffee and that he likewise did not fear or otherwise apprehend that he was about to be
splashed by the coffee. I also assume that nothing in the situation would have alerted the
reasonable person to the presence of bees, such that the pedestrian may be found
comparatively responsible.
64. Modern courts and commentators have tended to invert Cardozo’s analysis by
treating proximate cause, rather than the duty-breach nexus, as a sufficient instantiation
of the principle of not holding persons responsible for wrongful conduct that does not
wrong the plaintiff. This explains, in part, why they are content to eschew duty analysis.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES)
191 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002) (explaining the draft’s rejection of Palsgraf). It also
helps explain why Palsgraf is routinely, yet mistakenly, treated as a proximate cause
case. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (1998). My sense is that the two concepts ought to be treated as
complementary rather than as substitutes. The duty-breach nexus requirement better
explains the result in decisions like Palsgraf, whereas the notion of proximate cause
better explains cases such as the bee-sting hypothetical.
65. This account of proximate cause might even justify the use of tests that focus
on the physical and temporal distance between wrongful conduct and harm. At least in
some instances, the more remote the harm, the less ground it provides for a sense of
indignation at having been mistreated.
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cannot plausibly assert that he was mistreated by the defendant. To
use the language of older cases, one only has a claim to have been
wronged by another if the harm one suffers at the hands of the other has
come about through an “ordinary and natural” sequence of events.66
Essentially, tort law is available to plaintiffs who may justifiably
complain to the defendant: “How could you treat me that way?”67 In
instances in which a defendant’s careless conduct only fortuitously
generates a harm—even a type of harm that the defendant was dutybound to guard against—negligence law takes the view that the fact of
fortuity defeats the ability of the plaintiff to make that sort of complaint.
Confronted by the bee-sting plaintiff, our imagined littering driver can
point to the weird sequence of events and say: “I did not carelessly harm
you; I merely littered in your presence.” Thus, it is not quite right to say
that negligence law aims to compensate those who suffer losses flowing
from wrongs. The plaintiff must also have been wronged, such that she
might justifiably maintain a sense of victimization or indignation with
respect to her treatment at the hands of the defendant.
Articulating the rationale for proximate cause in terms of a requirement
of mistreatment or wronging has several advantages. First, and perhaps
most importantly, it offers a better justification for the existence of the
doctrine than conventional accounts. To the extent they purport to
explain proximate cause doctrine, these treat it as a fairness- or
efficiency-driven cap on “excessive” liability. Yet, as indicated above,
proximate cause doctrine does not prevent the imposition of huge
sanctions on tortfeasors: that is what makes the doctrine puzzling to the
organizers of this conference. Nor does efficiency help explain the
contours of proximate cause doctrine, given that there is no reason in the
abstract to suppose that society wants only those who are hurt ‘in the
right way’ to sue and thereby deter negligent conduct.68 As a result,
66. Ryan v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 209, 212 (1866). By “ordinary and
natural” I do not mean “as in nature” or “without human intervention.” Rather, I mean
that events have unfolded in such a way that an ordinary person, if told of them, would
not find their recounting especially strange or surprising. Also, I do not intend by this
invocation of Ryan’s conceptualization of the test for proximate cause to endorse the
particular holding of the decision—that the negligent igniter of a fire in a rail yard can
only be held responsible for fire damage to the first structure ignited by the fire. Indeed,
this holding seems quite inconsistent with that test.
67. My emphasis on the centrality to tort law of the idea of doing unto others
clearly owes a debt to Professor Weinrib’s work, which emphasizes the interrelation of “doer”
and “sufferer” in tort law. ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 81 (1995).
68. See generally John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO.
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many feel driven toward the skeptical conclusion that proximate cause is
incapable of being captured: it is just a label behind which judges engage
in ad hoc decisionmaking. The foregoing sketch, however, suggests an
answer to the skeptic in the form of a coherent account of proximate
cause that can, to a considerable extent, explain current doctrine.
Understanding proximate cause in terms of a notion of wronging or
mistreatment not only captures at a general level why tort law might care
about the fortuitousness of outcomes, and why modern courts focus on
foreseeability or scope of the risk. It can also explain some of the
specific contours of proximate cause doctrine. For example, it can
explain why “proximate cause” limitations vary in scope depending on
whether the defendant’s wrong was intentional or merely negligent.
Suppose that A shoots at B intending to kill her, but misses. The shot
proceeds to ricochet off an object and then blows apart a nearby bees’
nest. B is stung, causing an allergic reaction and serious injury. It is
quite possible that, if B can prove that A acted for the purpose of killing
B, A will be held liable for committing a battery against B. This even
though, had A only been careless—imagine he was cleaning his gun in
his very expansive backyard when, through carelessness, the gun accidentally
fired—his conduct might not be deemed a proximate cause of B’s
injury.69 What is the difference that explains why fortuitousness does
not defeat liability in the battery action, but does in the negligence
action? B would be utterly justified in feeling mistreated by A’s intentional
attempt to kill her regardless of the fortuitous manner in which her injury
came about, yet would not be justified in harboring that feeling had A
been only careless toward her so as fortuitously to produce an injury.
The foregoing analysis is also consistent with tort law’s embrace of
the thin skull rule. I have argued that fortuity is relevant to the determination
of whether a victim can claim to have been wronged. It does not follow
that, once a wronging has been established, fortuities as to the magnitude
of the loss flowing from the wrong should be counted in favor of the
tortfeasor. At least as between an innocent victim and a tortfeasor, the
legal rule permitting the jury to place the burden of bad luck on the
wrongdoer rather than the victim is intelligible.70 So, one can embrace
the foregoing account of the centrality of wronging to tort without
L.J. 513, 555–57 (2003) (criticizing economic analyses of tort doctrines of causation and
proximate cause).
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC
PRINCIPLES) § 33 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2003) (specifying that the scope of liability for
intentional wrongs is broader than that for careless wrongs).
70. The rule is intelligible, although perhaps in need of more justification than it is
usually given. See John C.P. Goldberg, Misconduct, Misfortune, and Just Compensation:
Weinstein on Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2034, 2040–41 (1997) (noting problems in
certain arguments advanced on behalf of the thin skull rule).
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having to eschew the well-established doctrine of the thin skull rule.
Alternatively, those who are appalled by what they take to be the evident
injustice of the thin skull rule can reject it while still endorsing my claim
that proximate cause matters to tort law because tort is concerned not
with wrongs per se, but with wrongings.71
Another advantage of conceptualizing proximate cause cases (as well
as certain duty cases) in terms of the idea of wronging is that this
reconstruction is quite consonant with, and indeed helps make sense of,
the historic linkage of the original common law tort action—the writ of
Modern
trespass—to a concern with breaches of the peace.72
commentators have tended to read into this concern a utilitarian ambition on
the part of tort law: it is there because tort law is all about the delivery of
the aggregate good of social order. Yet, the idea of “keeping the peace”
is equally capable of a deontic interpretation. Tort law, in this view,
aims to isolate, to the extent law’s categories are capable of doing so,
those instances of wrongful harming that will leave the victim with a
justified sense of having been injured through mistreatment by another
and with that, a corresponding belief that he is entitled to retaliate
against that other to vindicate his rights, rather than simply bemoan his
bad luck. In this way, tort law aims to keep the peace by enabling victims
who have been unfairly or otherwise wrongly treated to seek legal or
71. The requirement of having been wronged is not applicable to all tort actions.
Legislatures have occasionally relaxed the wronging requirement, as by enacting
survival and wrongful death actions that permit certain beneficiaries to sue those who
have wronged their decedent. It is possible, moreover, that the common law also
recognizes limited exceptions to the wronging requirement. This may be the case, for
example, with respect to certain applications of “transferred intent.” Here, a lot will
depend on whether the tortfeasor’s intentional misconduct toward one person also
constitutes intentional or careless misconduct toward the person who ends up getting
hurt. To the extent it does—as, for example, when D shoots in the general direction of A
and B, or shoots at A knowing that B is standing nearby—then D has clearly mistreated
B. The existence of a wronging or mistreatment is a closer question when, for example,
D shoots at A without believing, or having any reason to believe, that B is anywhere
nearby, yet hits B. Courts that would permit recovery in such a case may be, in effect,
imposing strict liability for injury caused by dangerous activities such as that of
intentionally firing a gun at another person. Alternatively, they may be “waiving” the
mistreatment requirement given B’s innocence and D’s culpable act.
72. In its standard formulation, the trespass writ required the plaintiff at least to
plead that the defendant had acted “against [the] peace.” J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION
TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 545 (4th ed. 2002) (providing an example of such a writ).
While this aspect of the writ carried primarily jurisdictional significance—it explained
why the suit belonged in royal rather than local court—it also conveyed what it is that
the royal courts aimed to accomplish by entertaining such claims.
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civil recourse for having been wronged.
Interestingly, Professor Sherwin offers in her conference paper a
picture of tort law largely consistent with the notion of empowering
individuals to avenge mistreatment. To her mind, however, this is cause
for regret over the very existence of tort law: the fact that its coherence
resides in an idea of a victim seeking vengeance against a wrongdoer
provides a reason to disparage the entire enterprise.73 Sherwin’s
disposition toward tort rests, however, on the undefended supposition
that, at least as a first-best matter, no department of law ought to
recognize or validate victims’ vengeful dispositions toward their
victimizers. Yet the foregoing account suggests, to the contrary, that tort
law serves a desirable civilizing function precisely by identifying
instances in which an injured person would be justified in harboring
feelings of mistreatment and a concomitant desire for vengeance, but
then demanding that the victim eschew self-help and instead channel
those feelings and that desire into a legal action seeking damages as
vindication for having been mistreated. In this view, tort can claim to be
a salutary branch of the law precisely because it provides civil redress or
recourse.74
In addition, Professor Sherwin ought to take some comfort in that the
law does not simply empower plaintiffs to sue whenever they subjectively
believe or feel that they have been mistreated. Law must enshrine and
set social norms.75 So, for example, negligence doctrine as it pertains to
emotional distress injuries must be fashioned in part out of a concern not
to foster excessive sensitivity, lest it promote, by means of affording a
remedy for certain instances of wrongfully caused emotional distress, a
norm of being thin-skinned.76 Likewise, tort law must take care not to
issue an overly broad invitation to the victims of harm at the hands of
others to feel indignation. Thus, tort law draws a line at foreseeability,
or at harm-within-the-risk, as a way of specifying an objective normative
standard as to when a victim may justifiably claim to have been wronged
by another.
The preceding sketches an account of the rationale for a proximate
cause limitation on responsibility for harms (and, if the symmetry
principle holds, an equivalent limitation on credit for benefits conferred).
73. Emily Sherwin, Compensation and Revenge, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387,
1411–13 (2003).
74. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 10, at 1641–46 (arguing that tort’s value
inheres in part in serving to channel vengeance into legal fora). For a general exposition
of a theory of civil recourse, as contrasted to theories of corrective justice, see Benjamin
C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003).
75. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 10, at 1679–84.
76. Id.
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It does not purport to identify the correct test for proximate cause,
although it has implications for that analysis. Nor does it purport to
account for every decision that denies responsibility or liability on
proximate cause grounds.77 Still, it does seem to offer a plausible
explanation of some of the main contours of proximate cause doctrine
within a broader conception of tort as a law of civil redress or recourse.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Commentary, I have tried to distill the basic claims contained
in Professor Perry’s cogent analysis of harm. Working off those claims,
I have also sought to demonstrate some of the underappreciated
complexities that attend the idea of injury and to articulate a coherent
conception of proximate cause within a civil recourse theory of tort law.
The concept of injury, it turns out, is more subtle than many of us have
recognized. By the same token, the concept of proximate cause is less
mysterious than is often supposed.

77. For example, to the extent the doctrine of superseding cause is viewed as a
proximate cause doctrine, I am unsure whether it is best viewed as instantiating the
requirement of a wronging.
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